Perceptual Capacities by Schellenberg, Susanna
When we perceive, we employ perceptual capacities by means of which 
we discriminate particulars in our environment. Seeing the red shade of 
an apple involves, for example, employing one’s capacity to discriminate 
red from other colors. More generally, we can say that to be a perceiver is 
to possess certain capacities, to perceive is to employ those capacities and 
employing perceptual capacities constitutes perceptual states.
What are perceptual capacities? A  perceptual capacity is a kind of 
discriminatory, selective capacity that we employ in perception, hallu-
cination or illusion. It is a low-level mental capacity that functions to 
di"erentiate, single out and in some cases classify mind-independent 
particulars of a specific type—for example, to discriminate and single 
out instances of red from instances of blue. While discriminating par-
ticulars can include classification, it does not require it. To say that per-
ceptual capacities are low-level is not to say that they are subpersonal 
but rather that they are cognitively less high-level than concepts (at least 
on most philosophical accounts of concepts). Perceptual capacities come 
in many varieties: There are perceptual capacities to discriminate lumi-
nance, motion, quantities, size, pitch, tone and distances, to name just 
a few. Some capacities are more basic than others. Some stand in com-
plex hierarchical structures. Some are always employed jointly with other 
capacities.
Drawing on work in cognitive psychology, neuroscience and devel-
opmental psychology, this chapter provides an analysis of perceptual 
capacities. It includes the following key elements:
Function of a Perceptual Capacity: The function of a perceptual capac-
ity C
Į
 is to discriminate and single out mind-independent particulars Į1, 
Į2, Į3, . . . Įn, that is, particulars of a specific type.
Individuation Condition: A perceptual capacity CĮ is individuated by 
the mind-independent particulars Į1, Į2, Į3, . . . Įn that the perceptual 
capacity functions to single out.
Possession Condition: A subject S possesses a perceptual capacity C
Į
 
if and only if the following counterfactual is true of S: S would be in a 
position to discriminate and single out a particular Į1, where Į1 is any 
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particular of the type that C
Į
 functions to discriminate and single out, if 
S were perceptually related to Į1, (i) assuming S is perceptually capable 
(awake, alert etc.), (ii) assuming no finking, masking or other exotic case 
obtains and (iii) where S being perceptually related to Į1 means that (a) 
the situational features are such that Į1 is perceivable by S (good lighting 
conditions, etc.), (b) S has the relevant sensory apparatus that allows her 
to gain information about Į1 and (c) S is spatially and temporally related 
to Į1 such that S is in a position to gain information about Į1 via her 
sensory apparatus.
Fallibility Condition: If a subject S employs a capacity C
Į
, C
Į
 can either 
fulfill its function or fail to fulfill its function, such that there is no dif-
ference at the level of employing C
Į
 but only a di"erence at the level of 
fulfilling its function. The function of C
Į
 is fulfilled if by employing C
Į
 a 
relevant particular is singled out. The function of C
Į
 fails to be fulfilled if 
by employing C
Į
 no relevant particular is singled out.
Asymmetry Condition: The employment of a perceptual capacity C
Į
 in 
cases in which C
Į
 fulfills its function is metaphysically more basic than 
the employment of C
Į
 in cases in which C
Į
 fails to fulfill its function.
Repeatability Condition: A necessary condition for C
Į
 to be a percep-
tual capacity is that C
Į
 is repeatable.
Physical Base Condition: If a subject S is employing a perceptual capac-
ity C
Į
, then there is a physical base of employing C
Į
 that is constituted by 
physical processes, events and structures (such as the neural activity) of S.
Informational Base Condition: If a subject S is employing a perceptual 
capacity C
Į
, then there is an informational base of employing C
Į
 that 
is constituted by the subpersonal psychological mechanism (information 
processing, computations and other subpersonal functional states, events 
and processes) of S.
I will provide an asymmetric counterfactual analysis of perceptual 
capacities that is built around these eight conditions. But first it will be 
helpful to give a brief history of the notion of capacity in cognitive sci-
ence and philosophy and to lay out the benefits of analyzing the mind in 
terms of mental capacities.
1.  Why Analyze the Mind in Terms of Mental 
Capacities?
The notion of a capacity is deeply entrenched in psychology and the brain 
sciences. Driven by the idea that a cognitive system has the capacity it 
does in virtue of its internal components and their organization, it is 
standard to appeal to capacities in cognitive psychology.1 Critical in the 
advent of the notion of capacity in cognitive psychology was Chomsky’s 
distinction between competence and performance, where a competence 
is a cognitive capacity and a performance is generated by employing a 
competence. In the case of language, a competence is a tacit grasp of the 
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structural properties of a language and the performance is the production 
of utterances (Chomsky, 1995).
In contrast to the centrality of capacities in psychology and the brain 
sciences, questions about mental capacities have been neglected in recent 
philosophical work.2 This is surprising given their importance in the his-
tory of philosophy, in the work of Aristotle and Kant, in particular. Until 
the beginning of the twentieth century, capacities and related concepts 
such as abilities, skills, powers and categories featured prominently in 
philosophical and scientific work on perception. Indeed, it was standard 
to analyze the mind in terms of capacities. With the linguistic turn, the 
norms changed and it became standard to analyze the mind in terms of 
representational content instead. No doubt the linguistic turn brought 
with it much clarity and precision. However, in sidelining capacities, a 
great deal was lost. The good news is that we are not forced to choose 
between analyzing the mind in terms of capacities and analyzing it in 
terms of representational content. Indeed, I will argue that employing 
mental capacities constitutes the representational content of mental 
states.
The main benefit of invoking capacities in an account of the mind is 
that it allows for an elegant counterfactual analysis of mental states: It 
allows us to analyze mental states on three distinct yet interrelated levels:
1. A first level of analysis pertains to the function of mental capacities.
2. A second level of analysis pertains to the mental capacities employed, 
irrespective of the context in which they are employed.
3. A third level of analysis pertains to the mental capacities employed, 
taking into account the context in which they are employed.
On the first level, we focus on the function of perceptual capacities, 
which is to discriminate and single out particulars of a specific type. 
A perceptual capacity has this function even if it is employed while fail-
ing to fulfill its function, as is the case in hallucination and illusion. 
Even in such a case, the capacity functions to discriminate and single 
out particulars of a specific type. Moreover, a perceptual capacity has 
this function even if it is more often than not employed while failing to 
fulfill its function.
On the second level of analysis, we focus on what is in common between 
mental states in which the same perceptual capacities are employed. On 
this level, it is irrelevant whether or not a perceptual capacity is employed 
such that it fulfills its function. As I argue elsewhere, in perceptions, hal-
lucinations and illusions with the same phenomenal character, the same 
perceptual capacities are employed. (Schellenberg, 2018b) So, on this sec-
ond level of analysis, perceptions, hallucinations and illusions with the 
same phenomenal character are on a par.
On the third level of analysis, we focus on the fact that perceptual 
capacities are employed in a specific environment, whereby a particular 
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is either successfully singled out or the experiencing subject fails to sin-
gle out a particular. In contrast to the second level, it matters, on this 
third level, whether or not a capacity is employed such that its function 
is fulfilled. So, on this level, perceptions di"er from hallucinations and 
illusions. This is the level of analysis on which we determine the token 
content of the relevant experiential state.
2. The Function of Perceptual Capacities
Perceptual capacities function to discriminate and single out particulars. 
More precisely:
Function of a Perceptual Capacity: The function of a perceptual 
capacity C
Į
 is to discriminate and single out mind-independent par-
ticulars Į1, Į2, Į3, . . . Įn, that is, particulars of a specific type.
A particular, as understood here, is a mind-independent object, event or 
property-instance. I use the notion of “singling out” rather than “refer-
ring” so as to remain neutral on whether perceptual capacities are con-
ceptual or nonconceptual. While referring has been argued to require 
conceptual capacities, singling out particulars requires no such capaci-
ties. Singling out a particular can be understood as a proto-conceptual 
analogue of referring to a particular. Non-rational animals and infants as 
young as four months old can perceptually single out particulars in their 
environment, yet on at least some notions of “reference” they do not 
have the capacity to refer. Moreover, on many views of reference, refer-
ring to a particular presupposes that the relevant subject is in a mental 
state with content.3 While I will show that analyzing perceptual states 
as constituted by employing perceptual capacities entails that those per-
ceptual states have representational content, we can remain neutral for 
now on whether perceptual experience has content. Thus, I use the term 
“singling out” so as not to presuppose a representational view.
The notion of function in play is a notion of natural function. It is nat-
ural in that it is independent of interpretation. So what function a capac-
ity has is not relative to an interpreter.4 There are many di"erent kinds 
of perceptual capacities. There are perceptual capacities that function to 
discriminate and single out objects of a specific type. Others function to 
discriminate and single out property instances of a specific type. Still oth-
ers function to discriminate and single out events of a specific type.
Natural functions can be given an etiological analysis; we can, how-
ever, work with the notion of a natural function while rejecting such 
an analysis. As I will argue, that is what we should do. According to 
etiological theories, something has a certain function because of what 
it is selected and adapted for (Ayala, 1970, Wright, 1973, Millikan, 
1989, Neander, 1991).5 Consider the heart’s function to pump blood. 
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The etiological theory explains this function by pointing to the fact that 
hearts were selected for pumping blood. While this is no doubt how it 
causally came about that hearts have the function to pump blood, the 
fact that hearts have this function is neutral on how they came to have 
it. Even if hearts came to have their function by some other means, they 
could still have the function to pump blood. More generally, we should 
distinguish what function something has from how it came to have that 
function. What is crucial for an analysis of capacities is what function 
they have, not how they came to have it.
In contrast to etiological theories, the view developed here is neutral 
on how mental capacities came to have their function. No doubt we have 
the perceptual capacities that we do due to our phylogenetic and ontoge-
netic background. The point is that we can analyze the function of those 
capacities without appealing to how we came to have them. Indeed, there 
is no sense in which the phylogenetic or ontogenetic history of a subject is 
relevant for determining the function of her capacities. A subject who dis-
criminates and singles out particulars in her environment via an implant 
can have perceptual capacities with the very same function as a subject 
who has those capacities due to her phylogenetic and ontogenetic back-
ground. While most mental capacities happen to have their function due 
to natural selection or some other natural process, nothing in the account 
developed here hinges on the matter.
For this reason, the account of mental states developed here does not 
face well-known problems of etiological theories of mental content. It 
does not, for example, face the problem of how to account for com-
plex capacities, the possession of which cannot be explained in terms of 
natural selection, adaptation or meme selection. Moreover, by contrast 
to etiological accounts, it does not face Davidson’s Swampman objection 
(Davidson, 1987: 443–444). Swampman is a creature that by astounding 
coincidence came into existence through a collision of particles caused by 
a lightning bolt. At the very same moment, Donald Davidson is struck by 
a lightning bolt and tragically dies. Swampman is a physical duplicate of 
Davidson, but his history is radically di"erent. He did not partake in any 
evolutionary history and there are no phylogenetic, ontogenetic or other 
etiological ways to explain his mental states. For this reason, etiologi-
cal accounts of function are forced to say that Swampman’s component 
parts do not have any functions. But according to capacitism, the view 
developed in the course of this book, a function is in no way dependent 
on the history of the subject employing the relevant capacity. Therefore, 
capacitism posits that Swampman possesses all the capacities that David-
son possessed shortly before being struck by lightning. Indeed, I argue 
that neither the content nor the epistemic force of a mental state depends 
on the history or reliability of employing the capacities that constitute 
that mental state. Since capacitism holds that the function of perceptual 
capacities is independent of the history of the subject employing those 
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capacities, the view posits that Swampman not only has mental states 
with content but also mental states with epistemic force.6
A perceptual capacity has a certain function irrespective of whether it 
fulfills its function in any particular context of employment. To explain 
why, it is helpful to distinguish capacities from their employment. While 
a capacity is a kind of mental tool, the employment of a capacity is a 
mental activity. Consider Sam, who possesses the perceptual capacity 
that functions to discriminate and single out red particulars. Just as Sam’s 
heart has the function to pump blood but may fail to pump blood, so 
Sam may employ her capacity while failing to single out any red particu-
lar. In such a case, the capacity failed to fulfill its function because the 
target of employing the capacity is not present: No red particular was 
discriminated and singled out.
A few clarifications are in order before we move on to developing 
the individuation conditions of perceptual capacities. First, for ƒ to be 
a natural function does not imply that ƒ is a biological function. While 
biological functions are natural functions, not all natural functions are 
biological functions. After all, a computer can have a natural function, 
but it does not have a biological function.
Second, it is crucial that the function of a perceptual capacity is not 
just a matter of discriminating particulars but is also a matter of singling 
them out. Due to this, perceiving an instance of red is distinct from per-
ceiving an instance of blue. Both cases may involve discriminating red 
from blue, but in the former case an instance of red is singled out, while 
in the latter case an instance of blue is singled out. So the capacities 
employed are distinct and the perceptual states constituted by employing 
those capacities di"er.
Third, while capacitism is compatible with functionalism, it does not 
commit one to functionalism. Functionalism individuates mental states 
not with regard to their internal constitution or their relation to the 
environment but on the basis of their function in the cognitive system 
of which they are a part (e.g., Lewis, 1966, Block, 1978). Capacitism 
individuates mental states on the basis of mental capacities and mind-
independent particulars: Mental states are constituted by the mental 
capacities employed and the particulars (if any) thereby singled out. The 
function of those capacities is not understood in terms of the role those 
capacities play in the cognitive system of which they are a part. Thus, 
capacitism does not entail functionalism. There may, however, be good 
reasons to integrate capacitism in a functionalist view of the mind.
2.1. Material Discrimination
When we perceptually discriminate Į from ȕ, we discriminate an actual, 
mind-independent particular Į to which we are perceptually related from 
a distinct actual, mind-independent particular ȕ to which we are similarly 
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perceptually related. Let’s call this kind of discrimination material dis-
crimination. When I speak of discrimination without further qualifica-
tion, I mean always material discrimination. Discriminating between two 
particulars in this sense does not require attending to both particulars. It 
requires only registering their di"erences. Consider Dylan, who is walk-
ing through thick foliage. It is unclear how she could be perceptually 
aware of, say, a leaf without registering how it di"ers in at least one 
respect from its surround. More generally, it is unclear how one could be 
perceptually aware of a particular without registering how it di"ers in at 
least one respect from its surround. The basic level of employing percep-
tual capacities is to discriminate one particular from another, where this 
discrimination is understood as registering their di"erences.7
Material discrimination is distinct from any notion of discrimination 
understood in terms of carving out possibility space. On such notions, 
to discriminate Į is to discriminate Į from other possible ways Į could 
be. In particular, material discrimination is to be distinguished from the 
notion of discrimination in relevant alternative views of knowledge (Aus-
tin, 1946, Dretske, 1969, 1981, Goldman, 1976), contextualism and 
pragmatic encroachment accounts (Hawthorne, 2003, Stanley, 2005, 
DeRose, 2009), as well as contrastivism (Scha"er, 2005). Subtleties aside, 
such views have it that to know that an object o has property F (in some 
circumstance), one must be able to rule out some relevant alternatives, 
that is, certain relevant situations in which o has, say, property G rather 
than F. On this notion of discrimination, to discriminate a property F 
that an object o instantiates is to discriminate F from relevant alternative 
ways o could be. As Pritchard puts it:
In the perceptual case at least, to be able to rule out an alternative 
is to be able to make the relevant discriminations between the target 
object and the object at issue in the alternative—e.g., to be able to 
discriminate between goldfinches and woodpeckers.
(Pritchard, 2010: 246)
On such relevant alternative views of knowledge, discrimination is neces-
sary for knowledge: To know, one must discriminate the way things are 
from relevant other ways they might be. The notion of discrimination is 
a matter of modal appreciation.8
Material discrimination is distinct from discriminating relevant alter-
natives in two ways. First, material discrimination is a matter of notic-
ing di"erences between actual, mind-independent particulars to which 
one is perceptually related rather than appreciating relevant alternatives. 
Second, material discrimination need not be cognitive (and typically is 
not), while any kind of modal appreciation and modal theorizing falls 
squarely in the cognitive realm. It is standard to distinguish perception 
and cognition. Perception is a kind of mental faculty that we share with 
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non-rational animals. While human perception might be rife with top-
down e"ects, there is no reason to think that modal appreciation is con-
stitutive of perception.
Material discrimination is distinct not only from appreciating relevant 
alternatives but also from detecting di"erences between mental states via 
introspection. It has been argued that two phenomenal states M1 and 
M2 di"er if and only if their subject can introspectively tell them apart. 
(Shoemaker, 1994) I am not denying that we can discriminate between 
phenomenal states in this way. We can call this introspective discrimina-
tion. The important point here is that in perceiving our environment, we 
discriminate between external, mind-independent particulars rather than 
mental states or aspects of mental states. According to capacitism, dis-
criminating such particulars constitutes perceptual states and indeed phe-
nomenal character and so is more basic than introspective discrimination.
3. The Individuation Condition
Perceptual capacities are individuated by the external, mind-independent 
particulars that they function to single out.
Individuation Condition: A perceptual capacity C
Į
 is individuated by 
the mind-independent particulars Į1, Į2, Į3,  .  .  . Įn that the perceptual 
capacity functions to single out.
Given that perceptual capacities are individuated externally, the per-
ceptual capacity that functions to single out instances of red di"ers from 
the perceptual capacity that functions to single out instances of scarlet 
or vermilion. There will be a perceptual capacity to discriminate and 
single out instances of red, a distinct perceptual capacity to discriminate 
and single out instances of scarlet and yet another perceptual capacity to 
discriminate and single out instances of vermilion. So perceptual capaci-
ties can be more or less fine-grained, and we can single out the very same 
particular with capacities that are more or less fine-grained. Suppose you 
see a field of flowers that are shades of red and yellow. You can employ 
your capacity to discriminate between red and yellow and thus be aware 
of a field of red and yellow flowers. Alternatively, you can employ your 
capacity to discriminate between crimson, scarlet and vermilion and 
between lemon, mustard and ocher and thus be aware of the colors in 
front of you in a more fine-grained way.
The external, mind-independent property instances that we can per-
ceive do not just include instances of intrinsic properties, such as intrinsic 
shapes, colors, sounds, smells, textures and the like.9 We always perceive 
from a perspective. As a consequence, we perceive under situational fea-
tures, that is, features such as the lighting conditions, color context, the 
acoustic conditions and our location in relation to the particulars per-
ceived. Thus, when we perceive a circular coin from di"erent angles, there 
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is a respect in which the coin looks circular throughout but also a respect 
in which the coin’s appearance changes. Likewise, when we perceive two 
trees of the same size located at di"erent distances from us, there is a 
respect in which they look the same size, but also a respect in which 
they appear di"erent. (Peacocke, 1983) Perception has both an invariant 
aspect—an aspect that remains stable across changes in perspective—and 
a variant aspect—an aspect that changes depending on one’s perspective. 
How should we account for the variant aspect of perception?
One option is to understand the variant aspect in terms of situation-
dependent properties.10 A situation-dependent property is an external, 
mind-independent property that is determined by an intrinsic property and 
relevant situational features (e.g., the perceiver’s location relative to the 
perceived intrinsic property, the lighting conditions, acoustic conditions, 
etc.). Situation-dependent properties are exclusively sensitive to and onto-
logically dependent on intrinsic properties and situational features. Any 
perceiver occupying the same location would, ceteris paribus, be presented 
with the same situation-dependent property. As with intrinsic properties, 
perceivers di"er, however, with regard to which situation-dependent prop-
erties are perceptually available to them, and they di"er in how they repre-
sent and are aware of situation-dependent properties. If this is right, then 
the external, mind-independent property instances that we can perceive 
include situation-dependent properties in addition to intrinsic properties.
The boundaries of the set of particulars that a capacity functions to 
single out is set by the world. It is not set by what a perceiver takes her 
perceptual capacity to function to single out. So the boundaries of my 
capacity to discriminate and single out squares is set by squares, not by 
what I take to be squares. If in perception I take something to be a square 
that is not in fact a square, I employ my perceptual capacity to discrimi-
nate and single out squares baselessly, while failing to single out a square. 
Thus, I presuppose a strong form of realism.
As we have seen, perceptual capacities are with regard to their indi-
viduation conditions analyzed in terms of mere relations to the world 
and so without any appeal to mental entities, be they, states, capacities or 
events. In this respect, capacitism builds on causal views of mental states. 
(Kripke, 1972’; Putnam, 1975; Burge, 1979; Devitt, 1981) However, as 
I will argue shortly, with regard to their possession conditions, the situa-
tion is more complex: The possession of at least some perceptual capaci-
ties requires possessing other perceptual capacities.
4. The Possession Condition
Perceptual capacities cannot be analyzed independently of analyzing 
their possession conditions. To possess a perceptual capacity is to be in 
a position to discriminate and single out the external, mind-independent 
particulars that the capacity functions to single out when perceptually 
related to such particulars and some further conditions hold. So if we 
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possess such a capacity, then—assuming no exotic case obtains—the fol-
lowing counterfactual holds: If we were perceptually related to a par-
ticular that the capacity functions to single out, then we would be in a 
position to discriminate and single out that particular. More precisely:
Possession Condition: A subject S possesses a perceptual capacity C
Į
 
if and only if the following counterfactual is true of S: S would be in a 
position to discriminate and single out a particular Į1, where Į1 is any 
particular of the type that C
Į
 functions to discriminate and single out, if 
S were perceptually related to Į1,
i. assuming S is perceptually capable (awake, alert, etc.),
ii. assuming no finking, masking or other exotic case obtains, and
iii. where S being perceptually related to Į1 means that (a) the situational 
features are such that Į1 is perceivable by S (good lighting conditions, 
etc.), (b) S has the relevant sensory apparatus that allows her to gain 
information about Į1 and (c) S is spatially and temporally related to 
Į1 such that S is in a position to gain information about Į1 via her 
sensory apparatus.
The condition requires only that a subject be in a position to discrimi-
nate and single out a particular of the type that C
Į
 functions to single 
out when perceptually related to one and not that she in fact do so. The 
reason for this is that even if the subject is perceptually related to a rel-
evant particular, she might for a variety of reasons fail to single out the 
particular, perhaps because she does not notice the particular due to her 
attention being directed elsewhere.
It will be helpful to specify each qualification of what it is to be percep-
tually related to a particular. The qualification that the subject is percep-
tually capable rules out cases in which the subject is not at that particular 
moment able to employ her perceptual capacity (perhaps because she is 
intoxicated or sleepy), even though she is generally capable of doing so. 
The qualification that no finking, masking or other exotic cases obtain 
rules out cases in which the subject mysteriously loses her capacity 
from one moment to the next. The inference from a claim about per-
ceptual capacities to a counterfactual fails in such cases.11 However, all 
the standard ways of fixing the disposition-to-counterfactual inference 
can be exploited for the capacity-to-counterfactual inference (see Lewis, 
1997). Finding a formulation of the capacity-to-counterfactual inference 
that is indefeasible in light of all possible finking, masking and similarly 
exotic cases would be a project of its own. Therefore, I will here work on 
the independently plausible assumption that no such exotic cases obtain.
The first specification of what it means to be perceptually related rules 
out cases in which the subject is causally related to a relevant particu-
lar Į1, but it is, for example, too dark or too noisy for her to perceive 
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the particular. The second specification rules out cases in which the rel-
evant subject does not have the sensory apparatus to perceive Į1, perhaps 
because her sensory organs are damaged. The third specification rules 
out cases in which the subject is causally related to a relevant particular 
Į1, but not in a way that allows her to gain information about Į1 via her 
sensory organs—perhaps because Į1 is so close to her eyes that she cannot 
properly make it out or so far away that she is unable to discriminate it 
from its surround.
Successfully employing a perceptual capacity to discriminate and single 
out particulars of a type requires being di"erentially sensitive to particu-
lars of that type in one’s environment. However, the counterfactual anal-
ysis of perceptual capacities entails that one could possess a perceptual 
capacity despite not being able at that very moment to respond di"er-
entially to the relevant particulars. If one is su#ciently intoxicated, one 
might not be able to respond di"erentially to much at all. In such states, 
one nonetheless possesses perceptual capacities. Moreover, if one does 
not have the relevant sensory apparatus or one’s sensory apparatus is 
impaired, one cannot be perceptually related to particulars that the per-
ceptual capacity functions to discriminate and single out. In those cases 
too, one nevertheless can possess perceptual capacities. One will just not 
be in a position to employ them while fulfilling their function without 
being appropriately connected to a sensory apparatus. In short, while 
successfully employing a perceptual capacity requires being di"erentially 
sensitive to particulars of the relevant type in one’s environment, possess-
ing a perceptual capacity is not subject to this requirement.
There are several close alternatives to the counterfactual analysis pro-
vided. A  conditional could, for example, be formulated in terms of a 
“might” or a “could.”
If the conditional were formulated in terms of a “might” or a “could,” 
the link between possessing a perceptual capacity and successfully 
employing it would be too weak to entail a constitutive relation between 
the perceptual capacities employed and the perceptual states thereby con-
stituted.12 Therefore, it is crucial that the conditional is formulated in 
terms of a “would.”
Now one might wonder what the connection is between possessing 
specific capacities and possessing closely related capacities. One might 
wonder, for example, whether there could be a perceiver who possesses 
only the capacity to discriminate red from other colors without possess-
ing any perceptual capacities to discriminate and single out other colors. 
More radically, can there be a perceiver who possesses only one percep-
tual capacity? In response, there is empirical evidence that possession of 
at least some perceptual capacities comes in clusters. For example, if one 
is able to discriminate angles from straight lines, one will also be able to 
discriminate curves from straight lines. And if one possesses the capacity 
to discriminate, for example, red from blue and single out red, one will 
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also possess the capacity to discriminate blue from red and single out 
blue.13
4.1. Possessing a Capacity vs. Employing a Capacity
What is the relation between possessing a capacity and employing it? It 
has been argued that one cannot claim one possesses a capacity if one 
has never employed it successfully (Aristotle, De Generatione Animalium 
2.3, 736b21–6 & 4.1, 766a5–10).14 It has been argued, moreover, that 
if one employs a capacity without it fulfilling its function, then one does 
not claim to possess the capacity at that moment (Millar, 2008). Aristotle 
attributes a view that is even more restrictive to the Megarians:
There are some—such as the Megarians—who say that something 
is capable only when it is acting, and when it is not acting it is not 
capable. For example, someone who is not building is not capable of 
building, but someone who is building is capable when he is build-
ing; and likewise, too in other cases. It is not hard to see the absurd 
consequences of this.
(Metaphysics, Book: 1046b)
On the Megarian view, one can possess a capacity only when one is suc-
cessfully employing it.
Against all these views, I am arguing that we can possess a capacity 
even if we never employ it. Possessing a capacity is thus metaphysically 
more fundamental than employing a capacity: A subject cannot employ a 
capacity that she does not possess, but she can possess a capacity without 
ever employing it.
Aristotle’s distinction between first and second potentiality of capaci-
ties and first and second actuality of capacities is helpful here (De Anima 
II.5: 417a22–417a30). We can distinguish between an English speaker’s 
innate capacity to speak a language (first potentiality), her capacity to 
speak English when she is sleeping (second potentiality) and her capacity 
to speak English when she is speaking English (second actuality). If one 
has first potentiality of a capacity, one is the kind of being that could 
possess that capacity. If one has second potentiality of a capacity, one 
possesses that capacity (Aristotle also calls this the first actuality of a 
capacity). If one manifests the second actuality of a capacity, one employs 
the capacity successfully.
A necessary condition for possessing a capacity is to be the kind of 
being who could possess that capacity and to meet some further con-
straint, such as being in an environment in which one has the opportunity 
to come to possess the capacity. Aristotle expresses this idea when he 
maintains that first potentiality is prior to second potentiality (or first 
actuality). A necessary condition for employing a capacity is to possess 
that capacity and to meet some further constraint, such as being in a 
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suitable environment. Aristotle expresses this idea when he maintains 
that first actuality is prior to second actuality.15
5. The Fallibility Condition
So far, we have analyzed perceptual capacities in light of their function 
to discriminate and single out particulars in perception. What happens 
when we fail to single out what we purport to single out, such as in cases 
of hallucination and illusion? I argue that perceptual capacities are fal-
lible in that the very same perceptual capacity can be employed in percep-
tion, hallucination and illusion.
Fallibility Condition: If a subject S employs a capacity C
Į
, C
Į
 can either 
fulfill its function or fail to fulfill its function, such that there is no dif-
ference at the level of employing C
Į
 but only a di"erence at the level of 
fulfilling its function. The function of C
Į
 is fulfilled if by employing C
Į
 a 
relevant particular is singled out. The function of C
Į
 fails to be fulfilled if 
by employing C
Į
 no relevant particular is singled out.
The relevant alternative to understanding capacities as fallible is to 
understand them as infallible. Millar among others understands percep-
tual capacities (including recognitional capacities) in this way:
If I had judged falsely that the plants in the plot were azaleas, I would 
not have exercised the recognitional ability in question. The general 
point here is that the notion of the exercise of a recognitional ability 
is a success notion.
(Millar, 2008: 333)
If capacities are understood as infallible, then one cannot employ a capac-
ity if one does not succeed in fulfilling its function. I will not here argue 
against infallibilist views of capacities but will focus rather on why we 
should understand perceptual capacities as fallible.
By way of analogy, consider that if we possess a concept, then we can 
employ it even if we fail to refer. After all, if we say “That’s a horse,” 
pointing to where in fact there is no horse, we are arguably using the very 
same concept horse that we would use if we were successfully pointing at 
a horse. The di"erence between the former and the latter case is simply 
that in the former, but not the latter, we fail to refer. The failure occurs 
at the level of reference. There is no failure at the level of employing the 
concept. If that is right, then there is no reason to think that the two cases 
di"er with regard to employing the concept horse.
The very same thing can be said of perceptual capacities. If we possess 
a perceptual capacity, then we can employ it even if we are not accurately 
perceiving. One could be prompted to employ a perceptual capacity due 
to non-standard circumstances: Unusual brain stimulations or misleading 
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distal inputs, for example. Given that capacities are determined by func-
tional relations between the perceiver and her environment and not by 
individual token responses, we can employ a capacity even if a relevant 
particular is not present. If this is right, then like concepts, perceptual 
capacities are fallible.
If we employ a concept but fail to refer, the concept employed remains 
empty. Analogously, if we employ a perceptual capacity but fail to single 
out a particular, the capacity is employed baselessly. It is employed base-
lessly in the sense that the usual target of discrimination and selection—
an external, mind-independent particular—is absent.
Let’s consider some examples. In the paradigmatic case of hallucina-
tion, it seems to us that there is an object where in fact there is no such 
object. Consider Kim when she hallucinates a white cup. She employs her 
capacity to discriminate and single out an object of a certain type. More-
over, she employs her capacity to discriminate and single out white from 
other colors along with capacities to single out various other property 
instances: Luminance, shapes, textures and so on. Since she is hallucinat-
ing and so not perceptually related to a white cup, all these capacities are 
employed baselessly.
In the paradigmatic case of illusion, it seems to us that an object has a 
property that it does not in fact instantiate. A subject who is su"ering an 
illusion is not perceptually related to at least one particular that she pur-
ports to single out. Say she sees an object that instantiates property pi, but 
given misleading circumstances, it seems to her (falsely) to be instantiat-
ing property ȡ. In such a case, she employs her capacity to discriminate 
and single out an instance of ȡ. But given that there is no ȡ-instance pre-
sent, she employs that capacity while failing to single out any particular. 
In the typical case, she will be employing several other capacities success-
fully. But insofar as she is su"ering an illusion, she employs at least one 
capacity baselessly.
Now in perception the particulars between which we discriminate 
are mind-independent particulars in our environment. This invites the 
question: What do we discriminate between when we employ perceptual 
capacities baselessly? In response: When we employ a capacity baselessly, 
we are not discriminating any mind-independent particulars. Indeed, we 
are not discriminating any particulars. We are employing a mental tool 
without that mental tool fulfilling its function. The important point for 
present purposes is that the fact that the mental tool is not fulfilling its 
function does not imply that we are not employing the mental tool.
5.1.  The Dependence of Perceptual Capacities on  
Mind-Independent Particulars
I have argued that while perceptual capacities are individuated by the 
particulars they function to single out, they can nonetheless be employed 
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baselessly. This invites the question of whether perceptual capacities are 
dependent on the particulars they function to single out.16 There are at 
least three di"erent ways of understanding this question, each of which 
requires its own response.
One way of understanding it is as a question about possessing capaci-
ties. Could a subject possess a perceptual capacity, even though she has 
never been perceptually related to a particular of the kind that the capac-
ity functions to single out? In response: Yes. After all, the capacity could 
be innate. The perceiver may have been unlucky and never been percep-
tually related to a relevant particular. So, despite possessing the capacity, 
the perceiver will never have had a chance to employ her capacity to 
successfully single out a relevant particular.
A second way of understanding the question is as a question about 
employing capacities. Could a perceptual capacity be employed even if 
the relevant particular is not present? In response: Yes. As noted, a per-
ceptual capacity could be employed in the absence of any relevant par-
ticular. This occurs in cases of hallucination and illusion.
A third way of understanding the question is as an existence question. 
Could a perceptual capacity exist that functions to single out a kind of 
particular that does not exist and has never existed? In response: No. Any 
perceptual capacities must be grounded in perception in the sense that any 
perceptual capacity must have been employed successfully by someone, 
somewhere. If that is right, then a perceptual capacity could not exist if 
no particular of the kind exists that the capacity functions to single out.17
In sum, while perceptual capacities are individuated by the particulars 
they function to single out, they are dependent on particulars only in the 
following sense: A perceptual capacity could not exist if no particular 
that it functions to discriminate and single out exists or ever has existed.
6. The Asymmetry Condition
While perceptual capacities are fallible and employable in perception, 
illusion and hallucination alike, there is an asymmetry between employ-
ing a capacity in perception and employing that same capacity in hallu-
cination or illusion.
Asymmetry Condition: The employment of a perceptual capacity C
Į
 in 
cases in which C
Į
 fulfills its function is metaphysically more basic than 
the employment of C
Į
 in cases in which C
Į
 fails to fulfill its function.
The reason for this asymmetry is that it is the function of a perceptual 
capacity to discriminate and single out particulars. It is not its function to fail 
to single out particulars. This is the case even if a perceptual capacity is more 
often than not employed unsuccessfully. As a consequence, there is both an 
explanatory and a metaphysical primacy of the employment of a perceptual 
capacity in perception over its employment in hallucination or illusion.
152 Susanna Schellenberg
There is an explanatory primacy of employing a perceptual capacity 
in perception over its employment in hallucination or illusion since one 
can give an analysis of the capacity employed in hallucination or illusion 
only by appealing to its role in perception. Consider again Kim when she 
su"ers a hallucination of a white cup on a desk. Even though she fails to 
single out anything white, she is in a phenomenal state that is as of an 
instance of white in virtue of employing the capacity to discriminate and 
single out white from other colors. She would single out an instance of 
white were she perceptually related to a white cup—assuming again that 
no finking, masking or other exotic case obtains. After all, she is employ-
ing a perceptual capacity the very function of which is to di"erentiate 
white from other colors and to single out white in her environment. In 
this sense, we need to refer to what Kim would discriminate between and 
what she would single out in perception to explain the role of the capaci-
ties she employs in hallucination.
Licensing this explanatory primacy, there is a metaphysical primacy 
of employing a perceptual capacity in perception over its employment in 
hallucination or illusion. There is such a metaphysical primacy since a 
perceptual capacity functions to do what it does in perception, namely, 
discriminate and single out particulars. It does not function to do what it 
does in hallucination or illusion, namely, fail to discriminate and single 
out the particular that one purports to single out. On one understanding 
of metaphysical primacy, we can associate things with natures and see if 
the nature of one thing makes reference to another. If so, the latter will 
be said to be relatively primary and the former secondary. We can then 
construct chains so that if the nature of A makes reference to B and the 
nature of B makes reference to C, then C will be primary, B secondary 
and A tertiary. According to capacitism, in hallucination and illusion 
the subject employs her perceptual capacities while failing to fulfill their 
function, and these capacities are by their nature defined in terms of suc-
cess in the perceptual case. Thus, the perceptual case is relatively primary 
and the hallucination and illusion cases are secondary. For the reasons 
discussed under the fallibility condition, the asymmetry condition does 
not imply that we must have successfully used a perceptual capacity in 
the past to employ that capacity in hallucination.
Another way of expressing the idea motivating the asymmetry condi-
tion is as follows: The fact that we can employ capacities while failing 
to single out particulars depends on the fact that we can employ such 
capacities to single out particulars. This idea is analogous to the idea 
that misrepresentation depends on representation. Indeed, if employing 
perceptual capacities yields representational content, the two ideas go 
hand in hand.18
The proposed asymmetric counterfactual analysis of perceptual capac-
ities di"ers in significant ways from Fodor’s asymmetrical causal depend-
ence account of mental representation (Fodor, 1987, 1990). According to 
Fodor, a mental state represents properties or objects only if it is reliably 
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tokened by the presence of the relevant properties or objects. A mental 
symbol represents, say, pigs only if it is reliably tokened by pigs. So reli-
ability is a necessary condition for Fodor’s account: Symbols of cognitive 
systems represent because of regularities between those cognitive systems 
and environments. Such regularities also explain what it is for such sym-
bols to represent in the first place. Like all tracking theories (Dretske, 
1981; Millikan, 1984), Fodor’s account faces indeterminacy problems. It 
fails to ground determinate content, which is required not just for avoid-
ing Quinean indeterminacy problems (e.g., undetached pig parts, pig 
timeslices), but also to allow for the possibility of misrepresentation (and 
thus for avoiding the “disjunction” problem) and for ruling out proximal 
contents (e.g., piggy retinal patterns). Fodor (1990) addresses these inde-
terminacy problems by adding several conditions to his original account. 
He stipulates (i) that the mental symbol must be actually caused (not just 
that it would be caused) by the object or property (i.e., by pigs) and (ii) 
that the mental symbol has actually been caused by the wrong kinds of 
objects or properties (i.e., non-pigs) and thus that misrepresentation is 
not simply possible but that it has actually occurred. Adding these extra 
conditions, however, undermines the power of the account to explain 
mental content.
The key problem with accounts of mental content that depend on reli-
ability conditions is the following: If a mental state M reliably represents 
P (e.g., pig), then M will also reliably represent the disjunction P v Q 
(e.g., pig or a bull terrier; pig or undetached pig part). After all, P and 
P v Q will be co-instantiated. The reliability relation does not cut finely 
enough to privilege P over the alternatives. In contrast to Fodor’s asym-
metrical causal dependence account, capacitism does not face these prob-
lems since it does not depend on the reliability of perceptual capacities.
7. The Repeatability Condition
A perceptual capacity must be repeatable. More precisely:
Repeatability Condition: A necessary condition for C
Į
 to be a percep-
tual capacity is that C
Į
 is repeatable.
The repeatability condition implies that it must be possible to employ C
Į
 
in at least two distinct contexts for C
Į
 to be a perceptual capacity. Now 
it might be that one possesses a perceptual capacity that one has—for 
whatever reason—employed only once, or indeed never. The requirement 
is not that one has in fact employed a perceptual capacity more than 
once, but that it is possible to employ that capacity in at least two distinct 
contexts. The contexts may di"er in at least the following five ways.
One way is with regard to the particulars singled out. In one context, 
the perceptual capacity C
Į
 can be employed to discriminate and single out 
the particular Į1; in another it can be employed to discriminate and single 
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out the particular Į2, where Į1 and Į2 are numerically distinct particulars 
each of which C
Į
 functions to discriminate and single out.
Second, the contexts could di"er with regard to whether the perceptual 
capacity is employed while fulfilling its function or employed while fail-
ing to fulfill its function. In one context, a perceptual capacity C
Į
 can be 
employed while succeeding in singling out the particular Į1; in another it 
can be employed while failing to single out any particular.
Third, the contexts could di"er with regard to the situational features 
that determine the conditions under which a particular is perceived— 
features such as lighting conditions, acoustic conditions or the angle and 
distance from which the particular is perceived. The perceptual capacity 
C
Į
 can be employed to discriminate and single out the particular Į1 under 
distinct situational features.19
Fourth, the contexts could di"er temporally. The perceptual capacity 
C
Į
 can be employed to discriminate and single out the particular Į1 at 
time t1 and at time t2.
Fifth, the contexts could di"er spatially. The perceptual capacity C
Į
 
can be employed to discriminate and single out the particular Į1 at loca-
tion L1 and at location L2.
In each of these five ways in which the contexts could di"er, the same 
perceptual capacity C
Į
 can be employed in two distinct contexts. As these 
examples of distinct contexts show, the bar for a perceptual capacity to 
be repeatable is low.
Now it may be that at least some particulars are correlated with a 
unique perceptual capacity. This is plausible if one allows that perceptual 
capacities are quite high-level. Let’s assume that Robin possesses a per-
ceptual capacity to discriminate and single out his mother. This percep-
tual capacity will be individuated by exactly one particular in the world. 
Nonetheless, the perceptual capacity is repeatable. After all, Robin can 
employ his capacity to single out his mother today and also tomorrow.
Capacitism is neutral on whether perceptual capacities function to sin-
gle out only low-level properties such as colors, shapes, sounds, smells 
and the like, or whether there are perceptual capacities that function to 
single out individual people, skyscrapers and pine trees as such. Nothing 
in the account presented in this chapter hinges on how the debate on 
whether perception represents only low-level properties or also high-level 
properties is resolved.
8.  The Physical Base and Informational Base  
of Perceptual Capacities
We can analyze perceptual states at three distinct levels:
I. The mental state level
II. The information-processing, computational level
III. The physical, neural level
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Employing perceptual capacities lies at the mental state level.20 Compu-
tational states, events and processes (as well as any other subpersonal 
functional states, events and processes) that support mental states lie at 
the information-processing level. Neural networks and neural activity (as 
well as other biological or mechanical structures, states, events and pro-
cesses) in which the other two levels are realized lie at the physical level.
What are the computational and neural underpinnings of employing 
perceptual capacities? What is the relation between mental states brought 
about by employing perceptual capacities and the non-mental states, 
events and processes in virtue of which they obtain? Any employment of 
a perceptual capacity has a physical base.
Physical Base Condition: If a subject S is employing a perceptual capac-
ity C
Į
, then there is a physical base of employing C
Į
 that is constituted 
by physical states, events and processes (such as the neural activity) of S.
The physical base condition allows for multiple realizability. So, the 
fact that employing perceptual capacities has a physical base does not 
imply an identity relation between employing a perceptual capacity and 
its physical base. Nor does it imply that there is an identity relation 
between the mental states constituted by employing perceptual capacities 
and the physical base of their employment.21
Any employment of a perceptual capacity has not only a physical base 
but also an informational base.
Informational Base Condition: If a subject S is employing a perceptual 
capacity C
Į
, then there is an informational base of employing C
Į
 that 
is constituted by the subpersonal psychological mechanism (information 
processing, computations and other subpersonal functional states, events 
and processes) of S.
There are complex relations between the information-processing level and 
the physical level. After all, neural networks encode  information. One cen-
tral question is what the relation is (if any) between information- processing 
modularity and neural modularity—assuming here standar dly, though not 
uncontroversially, that there are information- processing modules (Barrett 
and Kurzban, 2006; Evans and Frankish, 2009).  Information-processing 
modules are informationally encapsulated,  functionally specialized com-
putational mechanisms that are dedicated to perceptual or cognitive tasks: 
Specific perceptual discrimination,  biological classification, face recogni-
tion, to give just a few examples (Fodor, 1983; Coltheart, 1999; Barrett 
and Kurzban, 2006; Carruthers, 2006). Neural modularity is a claim about 
the relation between information-processing modules and physical neural 
networks, namely, that there is a one-to-one mapping between informa-
tion-processing modules and locations of neural activity.
It has been argued that information-processing modules have local-
ized neural bases and that evidence of neural modularity, and more spe-
cifically of neuroanatomical localization, is required to support claims 
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of information-processing modularity.22 There is, however, compelling 
evidence that information-processing modularity does not entail physi-
cal neural modularity.23 After all, information-processing modules are 
functionally characterized and could change over time—in response, for 
example, to damage (Segal, 1996). So, while at any given time there must 
be some neural structure (or analogous physical structure) that realizes 
each module’s processing mechanism and establishes its informational 
connections with other subsystems, these structures could change.
Furthermore, distinct information-processing modules might be 
grounded in the same neural structures. As with any complex biological 
or informational systems, there may be considerable sharing of physi-
cal parts between information-processing modules (Carruthers, 2006). 
Moreover, given the flexibility of neural networks and physical structures 
more generally, any commitment to physical modularity should be rejected 
(Lloyd, 2011). Thus, there is good evidence that information-processing 
modules need not have localized neural bases and that neuroanatomical 
localization is not required to support claims of information-processing 
modularity (Frankish, 2009). And indeed, we can accept the physical base 
condition on the employment of perceptual capacities without endorsing 
any one-to-one mapping between information-processing modules and 
locations of neural activity.
What about the relation between the mental state level and the infor-
mation-processing level? The view that perceptual states are constituted 
by employing perceptual capacities fits neatly with computationalism, 
according to which personal-level mental states are grounded in compu-
tational states. Now some reductive versions of computationalism have it 
that mental states are fully analyzable in computational terms. According 
to such views, personal-level mental states can be deduced from compu-
tational states, events and processes: Mental states simply are computa-
tional states at a certain stage of information processing.
We can accept that mental states are grounded in computational states, 
however, without endorsing such a reductive view. After all, states, events 
and processes on the mental level can be grounded in states, events and 
processes on the computational level even if no identity relations hold 
between the two levels. Accepting a grounding relation does not entail that 
personal-level mental states can be identified with or reduced to computa-
tional states, events and processes. Moreover, states, events and processes 
on the computational level can cause states, events and processes on the 
mental level even if no identity relations hold between the two levels. In 
short, mental states, events and processes can be grounded in, explained 
in terms of or obtain in virtue of computational states, events and pro-
cesses without any identity relations holding between the two levels.
This approach allows us to accept the existence of states, events and 
processes on both levels and to understand vision science and the cog-
nitive sciences, more generally, as investigating the metaphysical and 
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explanatory dependencies between the two levels. On this approach, the 
focus is not on whether there are identity relations between states, events 
and processes on the two levels but on the causal and grounding relations 
between the two (Strevens, 2004; Craver, 2007; Godfrey-Smith, 2008; 
Silva and Bickle, 2009; Craver and Darden, 2013). This allows us to 
acknowledge that an account of information processing is a necessary 
element of any complete account of perception, while also acknowledg-
ing that central questions, such as the nature and source of perceptual 
consciousness and the epistemic force of perceptual states, cannot be 
adequately addressed solely at the computational level.
As I have argued, employing perceptual capacities is grounded in sub-
personal computational mechanisms and physical neural networks that 
encode information. Thus, capacitism entails that perceptual states can 
be scientifically explained in terms of informational and physical states, 
events and processes without thereby reducing perceptual states to those 
non-mental features. In this way, capacitism posits that perceptual 
states are genuinely mental yet can nonetheless be the object of scientific 
inquiry.24
9. The Generality of Perceptual Capacities
A perceptual capacity is general in that it can be employed to single out 
any particular of the type that the capacity functions to discriminate and 
single out. In the typical case, no specific particular needs to be singled 
out in any specific employment of a perceptual capacity.25 Any particular 
will do, as long as it falls under the type of particulars that the capac-
ity functions to discriminate and single out. For example, the perceptual 
capacity Csquare can be employed to discriminate and single out any per-
ceivable square object. In this sense, it is semantically general in much 
the way as the concept square is semantically general. Semantic general-
ity should be distinguished from syntactic generality. While perceptual 
capacities are semantically general, they are syntactically singular: They 
function to single out particulars in the environment—not general kinds 
or universals. In this respect, they are akin to singular terms, such as 
demonstratives and indexicals. Not only are perceptual capacities syn-
tactically singular but the perceptual states they yield are syntactically 
singular as well.
9.1 Perceptual Capacities and Modes of Presentation
By employing a perceptual capacity in perception, we single out a par-
ticular in a certain way. Let’s say we are perceptually related to a triangle. 
We can single it out via its three-sidedness or via its three-corneredness. 
When we single it out via its three-sidedness we employ a di"erent capac-
ity than when we single it out via its three-corneredness. Similarly, when 
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we hear a cello in the midst of the cacophony of an orchestra, we can 
single it out in virtue of its rich timbre or its reverberating sound. When 
we see a ruby-red gemstone, we can single it out in virtue of its being red 
or in virtue of its being ruby-red.
As I have argued elsewhere, employing perceptual capacities consti-
tutes perceptual content, and this content is structured by singular modes 
of presentation.26 Employing perceptual capacities parallels Fregean 
modes of presentation both with regard to being ways of singling out 
particulars and with regard to the fact that any particular can be singled 
out by employing a range of di"erent perceptual capacities.
The idea that content is constituted by employing perceptual capacities 
by means of which we (purport to) single out particulars is analogous 
to the Fregean idea that modes of presentation are a way of grasping 
or referring to particulars. A mode of presentation is the specific way in 
which a subject refers to a particular.
While Frege introduces the distinction between sense and reference with 
a perceptual case, he does not develop the notion for perceptual content. 
His focus was never on lowly mental faculties like perception. Nonethe-
less, we can apply his view of modes of presentation to the case of percep-
tion. Applied to that case, the idea is that a mode of presentation is the 
specific way in which a subject singles out a perceived particular. Insofar 
as perceptual capacities are ways of singling out particulars, they can be 
understood as the mental counterpart of Fregean modes of presentation: 
As a mode of presentation is a way of referring to an object, employing 
a perceptual capacity is a way of singling out a particular. Moreover, just 
as there is a many–one relation between senses and references, there is 
a many–one relation between perceptual capacities and particulars. And 
while a mode of presentation is a component of a thought or a proposi-
tion, a perceptual capacity is a mental tool. According to Frege, concepts 
are mappings from objects onto truth-values (Frege, 1879). Similarly, 
perceptual capacities are mappings from particulars onto accuracy condi-
tions. Not only do perceptual capacities parallel modes of presentation 
in their role of singling out particulars, insofar as employing perceptual 
capacities constitutes perceptual states, but they have a certain cognitive 
significance. So like Fregean modes of presentations, perceptual capac-
ities play the dual role of having a cognitive significance and being a 
means of singling out particulars.
One key motivation for introducing perceptual capacities and modes 
of presentation is to capture a fineness of grain in content that refer-
ence to mind-independent particulars alone could not achieve. Acknowl-
edging that particulars are always singled out via employing perceptual 
capacities and grasped under modes of presentation makes room for the 
fact that any mind-independent particular can be represented in di"er-
ent ways. So any particular can be singled out via employing distinct 
perceptual capacities, and any particular can be grasped under di"erent 
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modes of presentation. On a Russellian understanding, alternative possi-
ble modes of presentation can be expressed only insofar as one may have 
di"erent cognitive attitudes to the same content. The way in which one 
perceives or thinks of the object is not expressed in the content proper. 
On the Fregean approach, every particular perceived will be represented 
under a mode of presentation.
Due to this, the Fregean view avoids counterexamples to Russellian 
representational views.27 Consider a case in which you are looking at 
a page of graph paper, a page of symmetrically arranged tiles. You can 
see the tiles as being grouped. There are a number of ways the tiles can 
be grouped depending on which tiles are seen to be more prominent. 
Now let’s say that at time t1 you see one set of tiles as prominent and at 
time t2 you see another set of tiles as prominent ceteris paribus. In such 
a case, there is no di"erence in the environment: The tiles perceived are 
exactly the same at t1 and t2. The only di"erence is how the mind groups 
the tiles.28 Since there is no change in the environment to which you are 
perceptually related, it is not clear how a Russellian would account for 
the change in representational content. A Fregean has no problem deal-
ing with such a case. A Fregean will say that you represent the tiles under 
di"erent modes of presentation at t1 and t2.
A more general advantage of the Fregean approach is that it accounts 
for the fact that thought is fundamentally perspectival. Applied to 
perception, it accounts for the fact that perception is fundamentally 
perspectival— perspectival not only in that we perceive from a location 
and so in an egocentric frame of reference, but also in that we always per-
ceive particulars under specific conditions (location, lighting conditions, 
acoustic conditions) with a specific set of perceptual capacities. There is 
always a way in which we discriminate and single out particulars in our 
environment. Consider Sasha, who hears jazz for the first time. When 
listening to John Surman’s recording of “Doxology” for the first time, she 
will not discern much. As she becomes an expert, she will discern signifi-
cantly more when listening to the very same recording. One explanation 
is that she develops more fine-grained perceptual capacities that allow 
her, for example, (1) to discriminate between the sound of the trumpet 
and the sound of the piano even when they are playing at the same time, 
and (2) to hear di"erences between chords. More radically, we can say 
that we cannot perceive a particular in our environment without perceiv-
ing it from our location with our specific perceptual capacities.29 In this 
sense, we cannot perceive without being constrained by our perspective. 
The Fregean approach acknowledges this.
There are two standard ways of thinking about Fregean modes of pres-
entation. If one focuses on the role of modes of presentation as account-
ing for cognitive significance, then it is natural to think of them as de 
dicto. A de dicto mode of presentation is general in that it can be the 
very same regardless of what (if anything) the experiencing subject is 
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perceptually related to. If, by contrast, one focuses on the role of modes 
of presentation as a way of referring to a particular, then it is natural to 
think of them as de re. A de re mode of presentation is singular in that 
what particular (if any) the subject is perceptually related to has repercus-
sions for the token content.
A de dicto mode of presentation lays down a condition that something 
must satisfy to be the particular determined by the content. Chalmers, 
among others, understands Fregean senses in this way: “Fregean content 
is supposed to be a sort of phenomenal content, such that, necessarily, 
an experience with the same phenomenal character has the same Fregean 
content” (2006: 99, see also Thompson, 2009). A de dicto mode of pres-
entation constitutes a way of representing mind-independent particulars 
irrespective of whether the relevant particulars are present. If the content 
of experiential states were constituted by de dicto modes of presentation, 
then the content of a perception, a hallucination or an illusion with the 
same phenomenal character would be
(ep,h, i) <MOPd
o, MOPd
F>
where MOPd
o is a de dicto mode of presentation of an object and MOPd
F 
is a de dicto mode of presentation of a property. Such an account of per-
ceptual content implies a two-stage view of determining reference: First, 
we represent a general content and in a second step, we refer to mind-
independent particulars based on this content.30 Representing a de dicto 
mode of presentation is, on this view, independent of the second step, in 
which a particular may be determined. Such a two-stage view faces the 
problem of how the content grounds the ability to refer to external par-
ticulars. Insofar as a de dicto mode of presentation can be the very same 
regardless of what (if anything) the experiencing subject is perceptually 
related to, this way of thinking about content amounts to a version of 
austere representationalism and faces all the di#culties of that view. Any 
view on which perceptual content is constituted by de dicto modes of 
presentation fails to satisfy the particularity desideratum for the same 
reasons that austere representationalism does.
This problem is avoided if perceptual content is analyzed as consti-
tuted by de re rather than de dicto modes of presentation. Understanding 
modes of presentation as de re is motivated by recognizing that modes 
of presentation play a dual role: They have a cognitive significance and 
they single out or refer to mind-independent particulars. Understanding 
perceptual content as constituted by de re modes of presentation recog-
nizes that representing a particular is not independent of singling out the 
particular that is the referent of the sense. By contrast to de dicto modes 
of presentation, de re modes of presentation are singular in the good case.
Now on one way of understanding de re modes of presentation, a 
subject can have a contentful experience only if she is (perceptually) 
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related to the very particular that she purports to single out. This view 
is a version of content disjunctivism.31 One problem is that the cogni-
tive significance and the action-guiding role of experiential content is 
downplayed. When a subject hallucinates, the way things seem to her 
plays a certain cognitive role. If it seems to her that she is perceptually 
related to a white cup, she may, for example, reach out and try to pick 
it up. If one denies that hallucinations have representational content, 
this cannot be explained. It is not clear how the mere illusion of con-
tent could motivate the subject to act. Consider Harman’s example of 
Ponce de Leon who was searching Florida for the mythical Fountain 
of Youth (Harman, 1990). The Fountain of Youth does not exist, yet 
Ponce de Leon was looking for something particular. As Harman argues 
convincingly, he was not looking for a mental object. He was looking 
for a mind-independent object that, as it so happened, unbeknownst 
to him, did not exist. A second problem—and the problem most sali-
ent for present purposes—is that, insofar as content disjunctivists hold 
that hallucinations do not represent, they leave unclear what explains 
the phenomenal character of hallucinations. So it is not clear how con-
tent disjunctivists satisfy the phenomenal sameness desideratum. While 
content disjunctivists acknowledge that a hallucination could seemingly 
have the same phenomenal character as a perception, they do little if 
anything to explain this phenomenon.
The problems of disjunctivism are avoided if perceptual content is not 
understood as radically object-dependent. That would allow that halluci-
nations can have at least some kind of content. One way to develop such 
a view is to argue that the content of a hallucination involves a gap that 
in the case of a perception is filled by a particular.
Recall that in Section  1, we distinguished between three levels at 
which to analyze mental states. The first level of analysis pertains to the 
function of the mental capacity. The second level of analysis pertains 
to the mental capacity employed, irrespective of the context in which 
it is employed. The third level of analysis pertains to the mental capac-
ity employed, taking into account the context in which it is employed. 
Applied to the notion of perceptual content, we can say that the second 
level of analysis pertains to the content type of a mental state, while the 
third level of analysis pertains to the token content of a mental state. The 
content type and the token content are both constituted by capacities 
that have a certain function. So the first level of analysis explains how the 
content type and the token content are connected beyond the one being 
a token of the other.
Harnessing this distinction, we can say that there is a content type that 
is constituted by the perceptual capacities employed. Consider the case in 
which a subject, let’s call her Miriam, employs two perceptual capacities, 
one that functions to single Į particulars and one that functions to single 
out pi particulars. Let’s say Į particulars are cups Į1 and the pi particulars 
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are instances white. In such a case, the content type of the perceptual 
state brought about by employing these two capacities will be:
(contentType) <MOPrĮ[___], MOPrpi[___]>
where MOPrĮ[___] is a content type that is constituted by employing 
the perceptual capacity C
Į
 that functions to single out particulars Į1, 
Į2, Į3,  .  .  . Įn; and MOPrpi[___] is a content type that is constituted by 
employing the perceptual capacity Cpi that functions to single out par-
ticulars pi1, pi2, pi3,  .  .  . pin. If in employing the perceptual capacity CĮ the 
particulars Į1 is singled out, then the token content of the perceptual 
state will be MOPrĮ(Į1). If in employing the perceptual capacity CĮ the 
particulars Į2 is singled out, then the token content of the perceptual 
state will be MOPrĮ(Į2). If in employing the perceptual capacity CĮ no 
particular is singled out, then the token content of the perceptual state 
will be MOPrĮ(__). So the content type MOPrpi[___] can be tokened by 
MOPrĮ(Į1), MOPrĮ(Į2) and MOPrĮ(__).
Let’s say Miriam sees a white cup and so singles out Į1 by employing CĮ 
and pi1 by employing Cpi. In this case, the token content of her perceptual 
state will be:
(contente1) <MOPrĮ(Į1), MOPrpi(pi1)>
where MOPrrĮ(Į1) is a singular mode of presentation of the cup Į1 that is 
the product of employing a perceptual capacity that functions to single 
out the kind of object under which Į1 falls. So “Į1” is functioning as the 
name of an object. “MOPrrĮ” is a functional expression that expresses 
a function from objects to singular modes of presentation. MOPrpi(pi1) is 
a singular mode of presentation of the property-instance pi1 that is the 
product of employing a perceptual capacity that functions to single out 
instances of the property under which pi1 falls. So while MOPrĮ(Į1) is a 
de re mode of presentation of the object Į1, MOPrpi(pi1) is a de re mode of 
presentation of the property-instance pi1.
Now let’s say that Miriam hallucinates a white cup. In this case, the 
token content of her hallucinatory state will be:
(contenth) <MOPrĮ(__), MOPrpi(__)>
where MOPrĮ(__) specifies the kind of object that would have to be 
present for the experience to be accurate, and MOPrpi(__) specifies the 
properties that this object would instantiate were the experience a per-
ception rather than a hallucination. More specifically, MOPrĮ(__) is a 
gappy mode of presentation that is the product of employing a perceptual 
capacity that functions to single out objects of the kind that the halluci-
nating subject purports to single out while failing to single out any such 
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object. It accounts for the intentional directedness of the experience at a 
(seeming) particular object. MOPrpi(__) is a gappy mode of presentation 
that is the product of employing a perceptual capacity that functions 
to single out property instances of the kind that the hallucinating sub-
ject purports to single out while failing to single out any such property-
instance. It accounts for the intentional directedness of the experience at 
a property-instance. In short, MOPrĮ(__) is a gappy, object-related mode 
of presentation and MOPrpi(__) is a gappy, property-related mode of pres-
entation. So for a perceptual capacity to be employed baselessly amounts 
to the ensuing token content being gappy. There is nothing metaphysi-
cally spooky about gaps. The gap simply marks the failure to single out 
a particular. Both Miriam’s hallucinatory state and her perceptual state 
are characterized by: 32
(contentType) <MOPrĮ[___], MOPrpi[___]>
9.2  Perceptual Capacities, Concepts and Nonconceptual 
Content
A perceptual capacity can be understood either as a conceptual or a non-
conceptual capacity. Which stance one takes will depend largely on how 
one understands the nature of concepts and their possession conditions. 
Depending on how concepts are understood, it is more or less plausible 
to think of perceptual content as conceptually structured. For this reason, 
the debate over whether perceptual content is conceptual or nonconcep-
tual is almost entirely terminological. One of the advantages of analyzing 
perceptual states (and, as I will argue, perceptual content) as constituted 
by employing perceptual capacities is that it allows us to sidestep the 
issue of whether perceptual content is conceptual or nonconceptual.33
Concepts have been understood in terms of mental representations, 
stereotypes, functional roles and inferential roles, to name just a few 
standard views. Nonconceptual content has been understood in terms 
of image-like or map-like representations, as constituted by employing 
nonconceptual, perceptual capacities, or in terms of the idea that we rep-
resent, naked properties and objects.
If concept possession requires the ability to draw inferences, then it is 
wildly implausible that the capacities employed in perception are concep-
tual capacities.34 After all, perception is a low-level mental faculty that 
we share with animals that have no inferential capacities. This implies 
that, if concept possession requires the ability to draw inferences, then it 
cannot be the case that all perceptual capacities are conceptual capacities. 
If, on the other hand, it is held that all perceivers possess concepts—even 
perceivers that have no inferential abilities or any other such high-level 
cognitive abilities—then it is more plausible that perceptual capacities are 
conceptual capacities. On such a view of concepts, the requirements for 
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concept possession are cognitively so minimal that it becomes unprob-
lematic to say that a honeybee possesses concepts and hence unproblem-
atic to say that perceptual capacities are conceptual.
While the debate on whether perceptual content is conceptual or non-
conceptual is almost entirely terminological, there are elements of the 
debate that are not terminological. Focusing on those elements, I argue 
that perceptual content is nonconceptual. The key motivations are to 
accommodate the fact that at least some aspects of perceptual content 
can be image-like or map-like and moreover to account for the richness 
and fineness of grain of perceptual experience.35
If perceptual content is constituted by employing such nonconceptual 
capacities, then perceptual content is nonconceptual. The thesis that per-
ceptual content is constituted by employing perceptual nonconceptual 
capacities gives a substantive analysis of the nonconceptual content of 
perception.
The thesis that perceptual content is nonconceptual is supported by the 
fact that on standard views of concepts, perceptual experience is richer 
and more fine-grained than our concepts. For example, the shades of 
color a perceiver is able to discriminate in perception are typically sig-
nificantly more fine-grained than her color concepts. If that is right (and 
on most notions of concepts it is), then richness and fineness of grain 
of perceptual experience supports the thesis that perceptual content is 
nonconceptual.
Additional evidence is provided by the fact that non-rational animals 
perceive. If non-rational animals do not possess concepts, then percep-
tual capacities cannot necessarily be conceptual. As mentioned, however, 
whether this additional evidence has any force depends on the notion of 
concept with which one is operating.
The conceptualist might object that if singular thoughts or perceptual 
beliefs inherit their content from perception, then perceptual content 
must have the same structure as the content of belief. If that is right, then 
perceptual content must be conceptual rather than nonconceptual. In 
response, the nonconceptualist can say that such beliefs can be based on 
perception without their content being exactly like perceptual content. 
After all, the fact that perceptual beliefs are based on perception does not 
imply that perceptual content is conceptual. While it is plausible that at 
least some elements of perceptual content are similar to the content of 
a belief based on that perception, the similarity need not be a matter of 
both mental states having conceptual content.
The conceptualist might object further that only something that is con-
ceptually structured can justify beliefs; so, if perceptual experience justi-
fies beliefs, then perceptual content must be conceptually structured. In 
response, the nonconceptualist can say that all we need for experience to 
play a justificatory role is that its content is propositionally structured. 
But content can be propositionally structured without being conceptually 
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structured. Moreover, there are reasons to question whether something 
must be propositionally structured in order to provide evidence.
In sum, there is good reason to understand perceptual content and per-
ceptual capacities as nonconceptual. The thesis that perceptual content 
is constituted by employing perceptual capacities allows for a substan-
tive way of analyzing perceptual content as nonconceptual. However, the 
thesis is also compatible with understanding (at least some) perceptual 
capacities as conceptual capacities. Indeed, one of the benefits of analyz-
ing perceptual content as constituted by perceptual capacities is that it 
allows one to sidestep the largely terminological debate over whether 
perceptual content is conceptual or nonconceptual.
10. Coda
I have developed an asymmetric counterfactual analysis of perceptual 
capacities. The asymmetry stems from the primacy of the employment of 
perceptual capacities when the capacities fulfill their function over their 
employment when they fail to fulfill their function. The analysis is coun-
terfactual, since (subtleties aside) one qualifies as possessing a perceptual 
capacity only if one would be in a position to discriminate and single out 
a particular of the type that the capacity functions to single out, were 
one perceptually related to such a particular. Moreover, the analysis is 
externalist insofar as capacities are individuated by the external, mind-
independent particulars that they function to discriminate and single out.
Notes
 1. See Cummins, 1985 for a good overview.
 2. There are notable exceptions. See, for example, Cartwright, 1994 and Sosa, 
2010.
 3. For discussion, see Hawthorne and Manley, 2012.
 4. For this reason, the account of capacities developed here does not face Den-
nett’s (1991) indeterminacy worries.
 5. For a critical discussion of etiological accounts of function, see Nanay, 2010. 
As Nanay argues, such accounts are circular.
 6. Schellenberg, 2013, 2017.
 7. For discussions of the role of pre-attentive discrimination in perception, see 
Julesz, 1981, Watson and Robson, 1981, Sagi and Julesz, 1985, Malik and 
Perona, 1990, Krummenacher and Grubert, 2010 and To, Gilchrist et al., 
2011.
 8. Accepting this is compatible with holding that perceptual knowledge results 
from the exercise of cognitive capacities operating on inputs received from 
perception. However, in Part III, I will develop a view of perceptual knowl-
edge that does not put any such intellectualist conditions on perceptual 
knowledge.
 9. I am here following Byrne and Hilbert (2003) in treating color properties, 
and similar such properties, as external, mind-independent intrinsic proper-
ties. My argument, however, easily generalizes to alternative views of color 
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as long as there are external, mind-independent properties, such as reflec-
tance properties or wavelength emittence properties, that form the basis for 
perception of colors.
 10. For a development of the notion of situation-dependent properties, see Schel-
lenberg, 2008. For critical discussions, see Cohen, 2010 and Jagnow, 2012.
 11. For a discussion of masking, see Johnston, 1992; for a discussion of finking, 
see Martin, 1996.
 12. For the distinction between “might”-conditionals and “would”-condi-
tionals, see Lewis, 1973: 21–24. For a discussion of “could”-conditionals, 
including a discussion of whether they are in fact conditionals, see Austin, 
1970: 211–213. See also DeRose and Grandy, 1999.
 13. For discussions of this set of issues, see in particular Li et al., 2004, 2009, 
Scott et al., 2007. See also Luna et al., 2005, de Lafuente and Romo, 2005, 
Chowdhury and DeAngelis, 2008, Law and Gold, 2008, Kahnt et al., 2011.
 14. See Caston, 2002 for a helpful discussion. Thanks to Victor Caston for help-
ful exchanges on Aristotle’s view of capacities and powers.
 15. For distinctions analogous to the distinction between employing a capacity 
and possessing a capacity, see Schellenberg, 2007, Glick, 2012, Vihvelin, 
2013 and Whittle, 2010.
 16. Thanks to Matt McGrath for raising this question.
 17. For a defense of this idea, see Schellenberg, 2018a.
 18. For a helpful discussion of asymmetry arguments, see Marušić, 2016.
 19. For a discussion of situational features, see Schellenberg, 2008.
 20. I use “mental” to refer to personal-level states, events and processes and 
“information processing” to refer to states, events and processes that are at 
a subpersonal level. To avoid terminological confusions, it is important to 
note that some have used “mental” to refer to states, events and processes at 
the subpersonal, computational level (see e.g., Fodor, 1975).
 21. The locution “of the subject S who is employing C
Į
” in the physical base 
condition need not be understood as implying that the physical base is a 
biological component of S. The physical base could be an implant.
 22. For discussion, see Fodor, 1983 and Panksepp and Panksepp, 2001. Note 
that they use the terminology of mental modules rather than information-
processing modules. For a helpful discussion of modularity, see Toribio, 
2002.
 23. For general discussion, see Koch et al., 2016.
 24. For helpful discussions of computational accounts of perception, see Egan, 
1992 and Cohen, 2010.
 25. Exceptions are perceptual capacities that function to single out one unique 
particular, such as Robin’s perceptual capacity to single out his mother.
 26. Schellenberg, 2011.
 27. See, for example, Neander, 1998; Macpherson, 2006 and Nickel, 2007.
 28. For a discussion of this case, see Nickel, 2007.
 29. For an excellent discussion of how best to understand the mental capacities 
we bring to bear in perceptual experience, see Speaks, 2005.
 30. For an argument against such a two-stage view of determining reference, see 
Johnston, 2004: 150f. Johnston does not distinguish between de dicto and 
de re modes of presentation, and as a consequence sees the problem articu-
lated in the main text as a problem for any Fregean view tout court. As I will 
show, it is only a problem for a view on which Fregean senses are de dicto 
rather than de re.
 31. For a defense of such a view, see Evans, 1982 and McDowell, 1984.
 32. Schellenberg, 2018b.
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 33. For discussion of nonconceptual content, see Peacocke, 1998; Heck, 2000 
and Speaks, 2005. For recent arguments for the idea that perceptual con-
tent is conceptually structured, see Glüer-Pagin, 2009 and Bengson et al., 
2011.
 34. For a view on which possessing concepts requires inferential capacities, see 
Brandom, 1994.
 35. The key arguments in this book can, however, be accepted if perceptual 
capacities are understood as conceptual rather than as nonconceptual 
capacities.
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